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PREFACE 
 
  Most people know of small and large properties that lie dormant because of real or 
perceived contamination from a prior use. Often, these brownfields are the properties believed to 
have “great potential,” held back only by the funding to clean up the contaminants. 
  In 1999, The Development Fund of San Francisco and Phoenix Land Recycling 
Company, a Pennsylvania nonprofit, decided to join forces to create a financing vehicle to clean 
up contaminated properties in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the William Penn Foundation, and the Vera I. 
Heinz Foundation funded the planning process. The Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and 
Cleveland supported the effort by inviting bankers to participate in the planning process. The 
Reserve Banks believed that many brownfields would be located in low- and moderate-income 
urban neighborhoods and understood that small-business owners often face contamination issues 
if they want to purchase the property where they operate their businesses.  
  After more than two years of discussion, the financing vehicle, Financial Resources for 
the Environment (FRE), failed to get off the ground. To help us and others understand why the 
result was not the positive outcome we expected, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
asked Keith Welks, the president of Phoenix Land Recycling Company and former chief counsel 
for the Department of Environmental Resources (the predecessor agency to the DEP), to write 
this paper about what happened and why.  The paper captures the complexity of the issues we 
confronted and serves as a guide for others interested in creating a consortium to tackle other 
financing challenges. While Keith was right in the middle of the action as the planning process   - 2 - 
advanced, stalled, and resumed, and some might argue he is not a neutral voice, we believe he 
has fairly and candidly discussed the problems that arose in creating FRE. 
  For others who are considering a similar vehicle, we would recommend noting the 
following lessons learned: 
•  Identifying a financing need can prove difficult. In the case of FRE, we had trouble 
identifying where the brownfields were, which owners could not obtain financing, or why 
they could not. We also did not have agreement on whether the financing need was long or 
short term. 
•  The continuing consolidation of the banking industry can be disruptive to such collaborative 
efforts. Several key banks were undergoing consolidation through merger and acquisition 
during the FRE planning and implementation process, thereby changing the leadership more 
than once.   
•  The biggest banks are the lenders most likely to already devote resources to special financing 
vehicles (such as brownfields financing) and therefore do not necessarily feel a strong need 
for a collaborative approach. But because of the bifurcation of the financial industry in most 
states into a relatively small number of large banks and a relatively large number of small 
banks, the participation of the large banks is often critical to the success of such collaborative 
efforts.  In the case of FRE, at least two of the three largest banks had to commit to the 
project in order for FRE to raise sufficient capital to have its first closing. 
•  The planning process for a financing vehicle requires a great deal of participation by the 
bankers, but the banks do not have officers to spare for a lengthy creative process, especially 
not officers in key decision-making positions. Although FRE’s planning process was initially   - 3 - 
conceived to be inclusive, the banks’ key decision makers were not participating in creating 
the entity, only evaluating it at the investor phase. 
•  Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) eligibility may be the sizzle for any investment, but it 
is not the steak. In the case of FRE, because CRA credit for an investment could not be 
ensured prior to FRE’s creation and origination of its first transactions, prospective bank 
investors judged the returns against other market opportunities.  The expected returns on 
investments in FRE were not high enough to offset the uncertainty of CRA credit for banks. 
•  Developing new financing vehicles is best done during economic expansions, rather than 
economic downturns. 
   We hope that you will learn from Keith Welks’s description of our efforts. 
 
      
Dede Myers 
Vice President and Community Affairs Officer 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia   - 4 - 
                                                
Introduction 
 
  The project to create Financial Resources for the Environment (FRE) was an ambitious 
but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish a financing intermediary for brownfields in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. According to the federal Environmental Protection Agency, 
brownfields are both previously developed properties with environmental remediation problems 
and properties suffering from the perception that the existence of such problems would be 
confirmed once the appropriate investigations were conducted. These sites have been 
unattractive to potential new owners or their lenders, who fear that the environmental issues will 
frustrate profitable reuse. FRE was intended to provide brownfield projects with a source of 
funding, desirable financing products, a unique methodology for evaluating loan applications, 
and dedicated and knowledgeable staffers, all in the hope of promoting reuse of sites that could 
not obtain private financing because of risk, return, and regulatory constraints.
1
  FRE was the brainchild of two nonprofit organizations: the San Francisco-based The 
Development Fund (TDF) and the Phoenix Land Recycling Company (Phoenix), a small 
Harrisburg entity. Before entering the brownfields area, TDF had spent 35 years creating what it 
calls “public purpose financing intermediaries.” These were consortia or independent entities, 
frequently operating for profit, established to provide financing for public-purpose needs that 
were going unmet by the private sector. Prior to its work on FRE in Pennsylvania, TDF had been 
responsible for creating 12 such intermediaries in nine different states, from Maine to Hawaii 
 
 
1“FRE” is the acronym that was used both for the organization that was envisioned to provide 
financing for brownfield projects and also for the process that was employed in the attempt to create this 
organization. The context of its usage here will make clear whether the acronym refers to the process, 
which did occur, or the organization itself, which was eventually created on paper but was never funded 
or made operational.   - 5 - 
                                                
and Washington to Florida. These intermediaries had attracted $1 billion in investment 
commitments. While the majority of TDF’s work had been in creating affordable housing 
consortia, its efforts included creation of a community development and small business entity 
and a secondary market fund that allowed insurance companies to invest in community activities 
and provide greater liquidity for investments initially made by community organizations.  
  Phoenix, also a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit, was the creation of a former chief counsel of 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. Its original mission was to make 
early speculative investments in difficult brownfield sites. By committing capital to investigate—
and in some instances, to clean up—existing environmental problems at brownfields, Phoenix 
hoped to reduce uncertainty and delay over such sites’ potential for reuse and thereby make them 
more marketable. After several years of site-specific activities, Phoenix became interested in 
developing programmatic solutions to systemic obstacles to brownfield reuse. Phoenix perceived 
difficulties in obtaining private-sector financing for brownfields, especially early financing for 
remediation activities, as one of these obstacles. 
  By happenstance, TDF staff had interviewed the president of Phoenix in late 1997 to 
gather information for a national research study TDF was preparing on financing gaps that 
impeded brownfield redevelopment efforts. This initial contact led to a decision to cooperate in 
an effort to develop a brownfields financial intermediary in Pennsylvania that could address 
funding obstacles that both TDF and Phoenix believed limited wider reuse of these sites.  TDF’s 
decision to work with Phoenix on a Pennsylvania entity followed shortly after TDF began 
working with a number of banks and other interested parties to develop a similar intermediary in 
California.
2 With principal funding from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
 
2 That intermediary was eventually created as the California Environmental Restoration Fund 
(CERF). CERF’s early experience was characterized by longer than expected delays in identifying   - 6 - 
                                                                                                                                                            
Protection (successor agency to the Department of Environmental Resources), the William Penn 
Foundation, and the Vera I. Heinz Endowment, TDF and Phoenix led the effort to create FRE. 
 
The Pennsylvania Context 
  Phoenix and TDF regarded Pennsylvania as a place that offered a setting particularly 
conducive to creating a brownfields financial intermediary for a number of reasons. Perhaps 
most important, in 1994 Pennsylvania’s General Assembly had enacted a series of laws designed 
to encourage brownfield redevelopment. The most significant of these was Act 2, formally called 
the Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act.  Act 2 dramatically changed 
remediation requirements for contaminated sites, authorizing parties to base their responses on 
the projected future uses of the site and to use remedies that allowed contaminated soil and 
groundwater to remain in place as long as their effects could be isolated from the public and the 
environment (by use, for example, of impermeable barriers). The Pennsylvania Legislature also 
enacted Act 3, the Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental 
Liability Protection Act, which provided protection for banks that foreclosed on brownfield sites 
or had other interaction with sites in the normal course of protecting security interests. Another 
new law, the Industrial Sites Assessment Act (Act 4), authorized the creation of a grant and low-
interest loan fund within the Department of Community and Economic Development to stimulate 
cleanup and redevelopment efforts at brownfield sites. Although this package of laws did not 
eliminate remediation problems at brownfield sites, it did provide important clarity and certainty 
for those willing to undertake such projects. 
 
projects suitable for funding. By the time FRE began its capital-raising efforts, CERF had developed a 
pipeline of projects. In the intervening years, CERF has proven to be a viable model for brownfield 
financing. It has closed on approximately $50 million in transactions and is reportedly reviewing another 
$75 million in proposals. CERF is examining the potential to offer its services in other states.  
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  Second, the Department of Environmental Protection had made aggressive 
implementation of these new laws and acceleration of site cleanup and reuse its highest 
priorities. The agency had trained its staff and done extensive public education across the 
Commonwealth. These efforts had been enormously successful. By 1998, TDF and Phoenix 
expected leaders of the Department of Environmental Protection to be looking for additional 
innovations and initiatives to continue the land-recycling program’s momentum.  In addition, the 
deputy secretary for the land-recycling program was a former environmental counsel for one of 
the Commonwealth’s major banks. TDF and Phoenix anticipated that her background would 
make her particularly interested in exploring new program directions that arose from a banking 
or financing context. Thus, the nonprofits expected to have strong support for the FRE process 
from the state agency responsible for the brownfields program. 
    Finally,  Pennsylvania’s  banking  environment at the start of the FRE effort was 
characterized by a relatively small number of major institutions.  This was seen as simplifying 
the process to create the brownfields financial intermediary because it kept the number of 
necessary participants down, making the effort more manageable.  In a similar way, the existence 
of a relatively small number of critical potential investors was expected to simplify the final step 
of the process: raising the actual investment capital needed to support FRE’s expected mission. 
TDF and Phoenix viewed each of these factors as a positive indicator for the eventual success of 
the FRE effort.  
The Creative Process 
  The particular process that Phoenix and TDF employed to design, establish, and – it was 
ultimately hoped – raise capital for FRE had been used by TDF in most of its previous attempts 
to establish intermediaries. The process, in brief, involved forming a large and inclusive task  
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force of representatives from banks, corporations, and other institutions that were expected 
eventually to become investors, supplemented by participants from other professions or areas 
with expertise in the particular field.   
For the process to create the brownfield intermediary, TDF and Phoenix recruited 
representatives from a number of Pennsylvania banks of varying sizes. They also enlisted the 
participation of lawyers with extensive brownfield experience, representatives from nonprofit 
economic development agencies, environmental engineers, commercial realtors, and developers.  
They secured participation by the PPL Corporation, a major Pennsylvania utility with a history 
of supporting economic and community development efforts. In addition, the FRE task force also 
included representatives from a number of public agencies, including the Department of 
Environmental Protection, the Department of Community and Economic Development, and the 
Department of Banking. In total, the task force enjoyed at least nominal membership of more 
than 60 representatives from banks, corporations, nonprofits, public agencies, and private firms.  
  The TDF model for creating an intermediary used a structure that relied on prominent and 
visible leaders to confer legitimacy on the effort and provide direction. Phoenix and TDF were 
able to persuade PPL Corporation’s chairman and the chairman and CEO of Summit Bank in 
Pennsylvania to serve as public co-chairs of the creative effort. A senior real estate lender and 
vice president from Summit served as the functional chairperson of the task force meetings. 
  Finally, TDF’s model relied on visible involvement and at least tacit support from the 
appropriate Federal Reserve Bank. This would provide not only additional legitimacy to the 
effort but also a ready source of guidance, advice, and insight regarding potential regulatory 
issues that might affect the envisioned intermediary. For the FRE effort, Phoenix and TDF 
received generous and continuing assistance from both the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia  
  - 9 - 
                                                
and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
3 Each Bank served as a host or co-convener for FRE 
meetings, many of which were conducted at Federal Reserve facilities. Representatives from 
each Bank provided bank contact information, suggestions for methods to improve participation, 
and general strategic advice.  
  TDF and Phoenix attempted to lead the task force through a careful process in which the 
group itself was expected to do most of the creative thinking and work necessary to better define 
the financing gap in Pennsylvania and design an entity tailored to address that gap. TDF and 
Phoenix provided staff support for task force meetings and for telephone conference calls of  
ad hoc committees of task force members that were held between task force meetings to address 
critical issues in detail. Reports and recommendations from these conference-call discussions on 
numerous key issues (e.g., whether FRE should be nonprofit or for-profit, types of products FRE 
should offer, size of loans, identification of key environmental issues, duration and nature of 
repayment, governance structure, parameters for investment in FRE, and many others) were 
presented at task force meetings for discussion and decision. 
  This process was, by all accounts, slow and tedious.  It is probably not an exaggeration to 
suggest that the work of the numerous committee calls and task force meetings, over many 
months, could have been performed in a matter of a month or two through dedicated effort by 
TDF and Phoenix staff. This more directed approach would have virtually obviated formation of 
the task force to design FRE. Nonetheless, TDF and Phoenix pursued the more deliberate and 
inclusive process for a very specific reason: TDF’s consistent experience in prior consortium 
projects had been that task force members became strongly committed to the eventual successful 
outcome of the process if they felt they had been intimately involved in the key decisions.   
 
3 However, the two Reserve Banks did not participate in the capital-raising efforts for FRE.   
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Having played an important role in creating the entity that emerged, task force members became 
its best advocates when the entity went to members’ sponsor organizations for capital 
contributions. This personal connection distinguished these public-purpose intermediaries during 
the fundraising phase from competing proposals that sought investments without having had any 
significant preceding dialogue or involvement with the potential investors. 
  Thus, the process used to design and create FRE quite consciously accepted the far longer 
development period and higher transactional costs (in terms of human resources devoted to task 
force activities by interested parties) in exchange for the anticipated return of eventually being 
able to solicit capital from sympathetic investors. In its application in Pennsylvania, 
unfortunately, FRE’s design process took far longer than was expected or helpful and seemed in 
many ways to exhaust, rather than energize, its participants. It ultimately did little to create a 
population of excited investors.  
  The FRE task force held 10 meetings between the inauguration of the project in 
December 1999 and the final meeting in February 2002, when initiation of fundraising was 
authorized. Attendance and interest were predictably high at the formal kick-off meeting but 
declined thereafter. Problems with attendance and interest were only exacerbated as the process 
stretched well beyond the original timeline, which had lending operations scheduled to start by 
the end of 2001.    
At the meetings, a pattern quickly developed in which only a few, presumably deeply 
interested, individuals attended regularly. Many of the most regular participants were the 
industry professionals (lawyers, engineers, developers, realtors), presumably motivated by a 
combination of civic interest in helping close the financing gap and pecuniary interest in 
cultivating future business. Regardless of motivation, they were not likely to be sources of future  
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capital contributions to FRE. After the initial meeting, only a few banks sent representatives at 
all. Many of these representatives attended intermittently or were replaced over time by different 
bank staff members, meaning that issues discussed and resolved at previous task force meetings 
would often need to be revisited and decided anew.    
    Difficulties caused by this inconsistency in attendance were compounded by the 
recurring inability of Phoenix and TDF to introduce topics in ways that sparked genuine 
discussions. As a result, stage-setting introductions by TDF and Phoenix staff often became 
effectively the entire substance of the discussions on key issues. This dynamic ultimately had 
corrosive consequences. With few potential institutional investors sending regular attendees and 
fewer still actively participating in task force discussions, little “ownership” of the kind that the 
deliberative process contemplated was actually created. Few strong advocates for FRE’s future 
were born. In addition, the lack of attendance, participation, and feedback meant that TDF and 
Phoenix gained little sense of how the banks really perceived the brownfield “problem.”   
  Whatever its previous successes, the careful creative process that TDF and Phoenix 
employed did not serve FRE well and did not achieve its desired objectives. Indeed, Phoenix and 
TDF were unable to discern whether the banks thought any financing shortfall actually existed 
or, if they believed it did, whether the proposed FRE design was responsive to the problem and 
attractive to potential investors.  
 
The FRE Product 
  Despite these frustrating and continuing problems with the creative process, in 2000 and 
2001 Phoenix and TDF pushed the task force to slowly work its way through a series of 
meetings, between-meeting work sessions, and decisions on a wide range of issues. Perhaps not  
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surprisingly, Phoenix and TDF came to the process with preconceived positions on many of the 
key issues the task force was asked to address. There is little doubt that Phoenix and TDF 
attempted, in good faith, to stimulate discussion on these issues and to test the validity and 
appeal of their preconceived answers. In retrospect, however, there is also little doubt that they 
were unable to generate genuine dialogue with a large enough number of people in the relevant 
audience. Thus, many decisions reflected a default to the preconceived positions, not the 
enthusiastic adoption of positions that reflected the results of genuine give-and-take discussions. 
  This is not to say that no topics provoked the airing of differing views. Several, in fact, 
resurfaced periodically throughout the process, prompting renewed attention – and resolution – 
with each reappearance. Most prominently, the very description of FRE’s mission and the scope 
of its market remained difficult to define. The TDF and Phoenix presumption was (in a 
simplified view) that FRE would provide financing directly to owners or developers for various 
site activities associated with addressing environmental concerns prior to construction or 
redevelopment.  This model was challenged at both tactical and strategic levels.   
  At the operational level, some participants insisted that FRE should not offer specific 
loans for assessment activities, for the very practical reason that such loans carried unacceptably 
high risks: a site that required an extensive assessment might ultimately be found to present 
significant and costly contamination problems.  This would mean both that no income-producing 
project was likely to follow and that the site itself could not serve as meaningful collateral to 
secure repayment of the loan.
4 In addition, there was uncertainty whether limiting FRE to 
lending only for pure remediation efforts (i.e., remedial actions consisting solely of removal or 
 
 
4 Pennsylvania’s grant and low-interest loan program (the Industrial Sites Reuse program) was 
seen as a possible response to the early-money obstacle, which the task force chose not to address by  
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treatment of wastes or contaminated soil or water) was wise in Pennsylvania. The 
Commonwealth’s endorsement of so-called containment remedies – the interposition of a barrier 
over contamination by such common measures as laying a foundation or paving a parking area – 
meant that dollars spent for traditional construction activities could also be said to contribute to a 
remediation effort. Task force discussions on this subject ultimately led to an expansion of 
FRE’s business model to make these kinds of construction costs eligible for financing when they 
advanced remedial objectives. 
  More fundamentally, a small number of participants brought a very different strategic 
vision of FRE’s marketplace. Either because they doubted the existence of a sufficient market of 
sites that simply needed a new source of private remediation financing or because they simply 
imagined a far more ambitious new entity, this group argued that originating relatively small 
loans to individual remediation projects should be only a small portion of the FRE portfolio.  
They advocated a FRE that would lend to businesses to finance the implementation of green (i.e., 
energy-saving) technologies and materials, the acquisition of pollution-control devices, and other 
environmentally friendly activities that did not necessarily involve brownfield sites. Rather than 
originating loans directly to brownfield projects, FRE should instead attempt to create a 
secondary market for brownfield loans.  This strategy would entail FRE’s establishing standards 
for banks to use in making brownfield loans that FRE could then acquire and assemble into 
portfolios for securitization in capital markets.   
The implicit uncertainty about the need for a new organization to make original loans to 
site owners and developers reflected by this profoundly different view of FRE was simply one 
manifestation of a fundamental uncertainty at the core of the entire process. Neither TDF nor 
 
eliminating assessment financing.      
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Phoenix nor the task force could confidently define the universe of potential customers for FRE’s 
presumptive, narrowly described services.  Task force discussions featured remarks from bankers 
who would claim, at successive meetings, that they had always been able to make loans at 
brownfield sites and then say – without acknowledging the apparent contradiction – that they 
would not make brownfield loans because the underlying properties did not represent solid 
collateral. Representatives from at least one small bank reliably attended task force meetings 
(and enthusiastically participated in working-session conference calls), even though they later 
explained that they had never received an application for a brownfield loan and had no 
expectations for any in the future.  A representative from a large bank repeatedly stated that no 
banks were making brownfield loans in large sections of Pennsylvania outside metropolitan 
areas; however, this banker could not identify any specific sites that his bank had rejected or that 
it expected would need loans.
5
  TDF and Phoenix conducted needs assessment surveys on both the supply and demand 
sides, canvassing bank and public lending programs on one hand and developers, realtors, and 
development agencies on the other. They held a focus group for about 15 developers and public-
agency representatives to gauge perceptions of need more precisely.
6 None of these efforts 
produced clear results. In the end, the task force probably did no more than accept the widely 
 
5  The relative availability of existing funding sources in Pennsylvania may have, in retrospect, 
been a significant factor differentiating the FRE context from that which existed in California. The ISR 
program, even with its budget limitations, and the willingness of a number of Pennsylvania banks to lend 
against brownfield sites once Act 2 was implemented may have blunted the perception that an entirely 
new financing entity was really needed to support Pennsylvania brownfield reuse. 
 
6 Many of the developers who attended this session were less interested in discussing the size of 
the problem than in describing their perception of a solution: flexible financing, including forgivable debt 
for all funding dedicated to early assessment and remediation efforts that did not lead to a viable 
commercial project. Unsurprisingly, FRE’s bankers were not especially motivated to grant this request.    
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held perception that only prime real estate brownfield projects undertaken by financially strong 
and experienced developers could reliably obtain financing and that no one had a good command 
of the magnitude, location, or economic viability of the other brownfield sites. 
  In the absence of a clear consensus that there was unmet need, the task force moved 
forward to resolve other questions. It was relatively easy to decide that assessment loans were 
unacceptably risky and would not be offered. It was significantly harder, however, to decide how 
FRE and its activities would relate to the business activities of its investors.   
The few banks attending task force meetings consistently expressed the view that they 
would not invest in a new entity that might then compete with them for loan business. There was 
a clear consensus that FRE should not book loans that could be obtained from a conventional 
lender but far less certainty about how to ensure that result. Differential pricing was considered, 
but there was a fear that FRE’s risky business model might intrinsically require it to charge high 
interest rates.  Thus, adding an additional increment intended to encourage some borrowers to go 
elsewhere might have had the additional and perverse effect of pricing FRE’s loans beyond the 
reach of the very customers it was designed to serve. Requiring a potential borrower to prove he 
had been declined previously also seemed unhelpful; it only added to a borrower’s transactional 
costs, and it was impossible to decide how extensive the previous declination needed to be (e.g., 
rejection by one bank? by all banks participating in FRE?) to authorize FRE to consider the 
application. 
  The sensitive question of FRE’s financial return to its investors was inextricably linked to 
the discussion of FRE’s pricing to its borrowers. Presentations to the task force and others 
carefully promised that investors would realize a “reasonable” rate of return. During the task   
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force discussions, the magnitude of the return to potential investors was ostensibly bolstered by 
the strong expectation that institutions would receive CRA credit for their investments in FRE.  
Most bank representatives at task force meetings consistently said that obtaining CRA credit was 
a valuable motivator for their ultimate financial participation and could help to make up for 
below-market rates of return on their investments. A small minority of task force bankers and 
others presciently expressed the view that CRA credits would ultimately offer little inducement 
to banks in their eventual decision-making and predicted that bank decisions to participate would 
be driven primarily by the projected return on their investment. 
  TDF and Phoenix prepared an interim report in December 2000 that was intended to 
present the key decisions the task force had reached by that point and to serve as the springboard 
for the completion of necessary incorporation documents and initiation of the fundraising effort.  
The report summarized the task force’s market research efforts and concluded (perhaps with too 
much certainty) that the research “identified significant financing gaps…includ[ing] viable 
projects that cannot obtain private financing…” The report articulated FRE’s intended mission to 
close this gap by serving a broad array of financing needs related to environmental cleanup, with 
priority given to sites that promoted community and economic development, sustainable growth, 
public health and environmental protection, and economic and environmental stewardship.  The 
overall objective would be “to serve private- and public-sector borrowers in transactions that are 
economically viable but cannot obtain bank and investor financing because of environmental 
contamination issues.” 
  FRE’s customers were predicted to be real estate developers (encompassing private 
development companies, public agencies, and community development corporations, and other   
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nonprofits), one-time purchasers of contaminated sites, and existing businesses or site owners 
who needed to address environmental problems to allow expansion or resolve other issues.   
These projected future borrowers would be able to obtain financing from FRE for pure 
remediation activities and for construction financing that was inextricably linked with cleanup or 
could not otherwise be obtained from conventional sources. FRE’s products were designed to be 
interest-only during the remediation (and construction) carrying period and then to be retired by 
conventional long-term bank financing, once the environmental problems were resolved.   
Recognizing that some FRE remediation loans might encounter difficulty in finding takeout 
financing, the report also noted that FRE might provide permanent financing for some of its 
projects where warranted. 
  FRE was to be created and operated as a for-profit, public-purpose limited partnership, 
managed by a limited liability company.
7 The governing board would consist of representatives 
from large, medium, and small investors and from nonprofits, the last included to help FRE 
qualify as a community development financial institution certified by the United States Treasury 
Department’s CDFI Fund. FRE staff would evaluate loan applications using an innovative 
process that would integrate the review of financial data and environmental criteria. The interim 
report explained that this approach would give FRE the flexibility to take and manage risks, 
allowing it to engage in transactions that would otherwise be declined by conventional lenders.  
An investment committee composed of only investor representatives would recommend actual 
loan decisions. Banks and corporations were to be offered the opportunity to participate in FRE 
 
 
7 For brevity, the structure described here is actually the more complex form that emerged in the 
final private placement memorandum. This was a refinement of a somewhat simpler structure described 
in the interim report.   
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as debt investors, equity investors, or a combination of both.
8
  Presentation of the interim report to the task force for final approval (and authorization to 
start the capital campaign) was delayed substantially by disagreements about its contents among 
a small number of key individuals. Representatives of the Department of Environmental 
Protection and several industry professionals felt that FRE’s business model was too narrowly 
cast.  They again suggested that loan origination should be only a small part of FRE’s activities, 
making the argument that FRE could avoid competing with its investors and eliminate 
discouraging high interest rates for original loans by structuring itself as a purchaser of 
brownfield-site loans made initially by conventional banks. In this approach, FRE would offer 
another exit option for banks making brownfield loans, rather than a source of original loans that 
banks would retain. FRE would help banks improve their own underwriting practices by 
developing standardized practices for decision-making and by offering technical services to 
traditional lenders. FRE would then become a secondary market for individual loans that 
followed these practices. FRE might also assemble purchased loans for securitized sale to capital 
markets. 
  This significant variation in approach had never, however, been formally examined by 
the task force or been the subject of the more intensive between-session working conference calls 
that preceded preparation of the interim report.  TDF and Phoenix believed that the interest level 
and stamina of the task force members at this point would not support a fundamental 
reevaluation of the basic FRE model by the task force.  Some participants continued to be highly 
skeptical of the fundamental business validity of casting FRE in the role of creator of a 
 
 
8Again, this description simplifies the capital structure, which was somewhat more complicated   
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secondary market for brownfield loans. After much discussion, the key participants agreed to 
include a cover memorandum with the interim report that called for the task force and a relevant 
subcommittee to consider these new ideas in conjunction with the review of the report itself.  
The interim report and the cover memorandum were finally distributed in late April 2001, some 
four months after original preparation of the report. 
  Although adding the cover memorandum was an effort to amicably resolve a contentious 
issue that would have been far better off addressed much earlier, it is likely that it only 
introduced significant confusion to the process in its final stages. The memorandum, despite 
being brief and neutral in tone, effectively called into question the basic purpose and structure of 
FRE, as well as its relationship to banks (both those investing and those who remained distinct 
from FRE). Moreover, resolution of the fundamental questions it implicitly raised would have 
required commitment of substantial new resources — in terms of time and money — by the task 
force at a very late stage of its existence. 
 
The Fundraising Phase 
  In the end, the task force lacked the energy or interest necessary to effectively grapple 
with these lingering issues.  TDF and Phoenix assembled the task force following circulation and 
discussion of the interim report and cover memorandum to obtain authorization for moving to the 
final phase. This phase would comprise a) creation of the entity’s legal documents describing 
organizational structure and participation opportunities and b) the interrelated searches for a 
leader for FRE and for investors willing to capitalize the entity. The task force acknowledged the 
 
in the actual offering to address start-up and early costs and governance details.   
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apparent conflict between the focused vision of FRE laid out in the report and the ambitious 
version suggested in the memorandum, but the task force exhibited little enthusiasm for choosing 
between these inconsistent models. Instead, it finessed the problem by endorsing the 
recommendations of the report in February 2002 and charging FRE’s staff, once FRE was 
operational, to consider the ideas presented in the memorandum for future expansion 
possibilities.    
    With this qualified blessing, TDF and Phoenix began their efforts to fund and inaugurate 
FRE.  Phoenix and TDF worked with Pepper Hamilton, L.L.P., legal counsel during the creation 
stage, to finalize a private placement memorandum (PPM) that refined and explicated FRE’s 
purpose, practices, and structure. At the same time, TDF developed detailed financial projections 
for FRE’s first decade of activities.  The assumptions and conclusions embodied in the financials 
were then vetted by a finance subcommittee of the task force, populated by bankers and 
nonprofit lenders with extensive experience in analyzing similar projections. Economic analysts 
from PPL, who volunteered significant time to review and refine the projections, also subjected 
the financials to extremely close review. The projections were modified over the spring and 
summer of 2002 to reflect these comments. 
As part of the financial calculations, TDF also made available for the first time specific 
projections about the returns investors might see on their investments. Debt investors were 
projected to receive a 4.1 percent 10-year internal rate of return; equity investors were projected 
to receive an 8.7 percent return, with the potential to receive as high as 23.9 percent if a high 
proportion of the original investors opted to become debt participants rather than equity players.
9   
 
 
9 Although FRE hoped to earn above-average returns on successful projects, this recovery was   
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  As these materials were being finalized, TDF and Phoenix conducted a national search to 
select a chief executive for FRE. Designation of FRE’s leader was seen as an important 
component of the capital campaign, since banks were expected to demand to know the identity of 
the person responsible for overseeing their investment before agreeing to a definitive 
commitment.  
The search for a candidate took place over a period of months in the second half of 2002 
and early 2003.  TDF and Phoenix engaged in a national solicitation for candidates and provided 
preliminary evaluations of applicants. A selection committee of the task force identified a finalist 
from a number of candidates who were interviewed, and he was offered the position. To TDF’s 
and Phoenix’s consternation, the candidate unexpectedly withdrew his name from consideration 
after several weeks, despite having aggressively sought the post and without making any 
demands about the position or his compensation.  The committee then offered the position to the 
next highly rated candidate, also a skilled and qualified leader. She, too, then declined the FRE 
presidency (for personal reasons). The committee ultimately selected a senior real estate lender 
with community development experience.   
This candidate accepted the position and threw herself into fundraising activities with 
great enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the leadership selection process was bogged down for several 
months, sapping momentum from the parallel capitalization effort in its critical early stages.  
Recognizing the already-too-long gestation period for FRE, Phoenix and TDF had begun their 
outreach efforts to many banks coincident with the start of the executive search process. As the 
search process continued to fail to produce a final selection, meetings needed to be postponed, 
or, in some instances, meetings that had been held needed to be held again once FRE’s leader 
 
too speculative and unpredictable to be factored into the calculation of projections.   
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was finally chosen. Unavoidably, a sense of confusion or lack of direction was communicated to 
potential investors by early 2003. 
  Ultimately, the fundraising efforts were unsuccessful. The PPM established a minimum 
of $25 million in start-up capital, based on the financial projections, for FRE to be economically 
viable. FRE was able to obtain a $2 million pledge from the Department of Community and 
Economic Development (from the Industrial Sites Reuse program) but was unable to leverage 
this money into any additional firm commitments.  After more than nine months of attempting to 
attract investors, TDF and Phoenix formally curtailed their efforts in late summer of 2003.   
 
  Evaluation of Shortcomings 
  Although it may sometimes be true that success has a thousand fathers while failure 
remains an orphan, there is no shortage of potential parents of FRE’s ultimate inability to 
conclude its lengthy process with a successful capital campaign. Indeed, there are so many 
candidates that it may be difficult to determine which factors genuinely contributed to the 
unsuccessful outcome and which were merely unhelpful background noise. Still, any list of 
suspects must surely include the following. 
 
Failure to Confirm or Define a Need 
  FRE’s premise was simple to state: there was an abundance of economically viable 
Pennsylvania brownfield sites that could thrive with access to remediation loans made by a 
lender sophisticated enough to recognize their true environmental costs. Confirming that these 
sites actually existed, however, and quantifying their number adequately to support a compelling   
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business plan resolutely remained beyond the grasp of TDF, Phoenix, and the task force.
10  
Many task force members spoke with conviction about anecdotal perceptions of an ample supply 
of sites. Nonetheless, efforts to have banks or regional economic development agencies generate 
hard numbers consistently produced results that encouraged little confidence. Bankers who stated 
in task force meetings that they were making few brownfield loans frequently followed up that 
declaration with the caveat that neither were they turning down many requests.  This left the task 
force pondering whether there was a giant untapped market of customers for FRE or none at all. 
  Additionally, it was clear that bigger banks were more apt to already be doing brownfield 
lending than smaller ones, creating a divide in perceptions about whether the marketplace was 
being adequately served. Ultimately, this also meant that the concentrated nature of the banking 
industry in Pennsylvania, initially seen as a highly attractive component of the local context for 
launching a brownfield financing intermediary, was, in fact, extremely problematic. FRE’s 
internal financing structure effectively required it to secure participation commitments of almost 
$10 million each from at least two of the state’s three remaining major banks in order to move 
forward.
11 Without participation of this magnitude from these critical banks, it was virtually 
impossible for FRE to raise sufficient capital from the remainder of the industry. Unfortunately, 
these turned out to be the very same few large banks that were among the most skeptical of the 
need for a brownfield financing intermediary. Moreover, at least two of the three major 
 
 
10 TDF’s earlier national research report describing financing problems was regarded, probably 
accurately, as becoming outdated as the process progressed and reflecting too broad a view to helpfully 
depict the Pennsylvania situation. DEP’s existing data sets did not allow it to respond in detail when the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia requested information about numbers and locations of brownfield 
sites for purposes of evaluating the likelihood that bank investments in FRE would be CRA-eligible. 
11 FRE expected to obtain the remainder of the minimum $25 million start-up commitment 
through more modest investments from a significant number of smaller institutions.   
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Pennsylvania banks had institutional reasons, unrelated to the specific nature of FRE’s proposal, 
that strongly discouraged them from agreeing to participate. 
Paradoxically, the success of Pennsylvania’s regulatory land-recycling program and the 
ISR program also represented confounding factors. The regulatory climate made the state a 
potentially attractive place for an entity like FRE, dedicated to promoting brownfield reuse. At 
the same time, it soon became clear that at least some task force members believed that reforms 
to the remediation requirements had so reduced risks for lenders and borrowers that a specialized 
lending entity was no longer needed.  In the same manner, some perceived the support provided 
by ISR as a complete solution to the purported funding gap, even though the state program in 
reality focused the majority of its limited funds on public projects. 
  Task force meetings all too often devolved into repetitive, circular discussions about the 
magnitude of need and possible shortcomings in current bank practices to meet it. These 
discussions rarely produced clear answers to questions, and in the unusual instances when clarity 
was momentarily achieved, it could not be easily revived the next time the same topic surfaced. 
  The inability to reach consensus about the question of need engendered a number of 
troubling consequential problems. The task force’s failure to strongly agree that there was a large 
unserved market made it much harder to marshal enthusiasm for either the effort or the risk 
involved in establishing an entity to serve that market. Uncertainty about the scope of the need 
inexorably led to the fragmentation of ideas proposed for the products FRE should offer its 
customers. Those believing that basic loan needs were going unmet at brownfield sites 
understandably continued to believe that FRE should primarily be constituted as a loan 
originator, dealing directly with borrowers.  Again, those regarding the banking sector as largely   
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meeting brownfield needs or poised to meet them with just a bit of assistance saw FRE’s value in 
being an indirect player, providing technical assistance to banks in their existing loan business, 
and perhaps buying and securitizing brownfield loans made by those banks. 
  These fundamental differences played themselves out, as well, in ultimately fruitless 
efforts to define FRE’s relationship with its investors.  Although the task force leadership did not 
recognize their significance at the time, debates about whether FRE’s activities would present an 
unwelcome competitive threat to other banks were simply another manifestation of the schism 
about the adequacy of present bank practices. If most banks were, in fact, turning away 
brownfield loan applications of the sort that FRE initially envisioned making, competition for 
these borrowers was not a realistic fear and coordination between banks as sources of customer 
referrals and FRE as a source of funding for these referrals could easily be imagined. If, 
however, banks were already serving this market aggressively, it would be valid to presume that 
FRE could survive only by taking business from its own investors. The specter of this 
dysfunctional relationship supported moving FRE from the direct banking business into a range 
of essentially support services for the banks. 
  Sadly, the issue of FRE’s role was never truly resolved. The task force simply legitimized 
its many months of genuine, if inconclusive, efforts by approving a model for FRE that looked 
much like the original version. A final decision regarding the more ambitious business scheme 
was deferred to further consideration by the FRE staff, once FRE was up and running. That 
precondition for extended analysis, of course, was never brought into existence. 
Shortcomings in the Process to Develop FRE  
  The consensus-building process used by TDF and Phoenix for developing FRE was not   
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new.  It had been successfully employed on many occasions in many places to create a variety of 
financing and funding entities of differing sizes and functions. Thus, this deliberative and 
inclusive approach, with its preference for involving many participants over an extended period 
to arrive at conclusions that a dedicated few could reach in a fraction of the same time, might be 
viewed as artificial, but it arrived in Pennsylvania with strong precedents.
12 Nevertheless, it is 
very clear that the process was ineffective in this particular context and may, in fact, have 
impeded the overall project. Certainly the creative process, which stretched 27 months — from 
December 1999 to February 2002 — just to reach the capitalization phase, took far longer than 
anyone desired. 
  There are a number of possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of the process here.  
A process that seeks to resolve a large number of complex issues through informal consensus 
building about key decisions ordinarily relies to a large extent on continuity of its participants 
and commonality in their vision.  The FRE task force could boast of neither of those attributes.  
In their absence, it might well have been better to introduce a measure of formality by taking and 
recording votes on key questions. Records of these votes could have been helpful in abbreviating 
the repetitive and circular discussions that occurred at subsequent meetings, when different 
participants sought to revisit issues already addressed. 
    Also, some perceive that the nature and expectations of the banking industry have 
evolved over the last several years, making the patient, inclusive approach no longer viable. In 
this view, banks previously had not just allowed their senior people more time and freedom to 
 
 
12 As noted, TDF contemporaneously used the same process to create a very similar intermediary 
for California, a state with far more complex regulatory and political challenges than Pennsylvania. That 
effort culminated in a completed intermediary that has been making brownfield loans statewide.   
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involve themselves in the details of proposed investments; they implicitly demanded that kind of 
inside developmental knowledge before passing favorably upon new proposals for their 
investment capital. As the industry consolidated, became more competitive, and focused more on 
reducing costs at every opportunity, this tolerance for long hours of ostensibly unproductive 
employee effort in these undertakings appears to have declined dramatically. External projects 
that consumed substantial staff resources for development no longer carried any special cachet 
when presented for investment review. 
  Perhaps for this reason, or perhaps because the initial recruitment efforts of TDF and 
Phoenix were misdirected, the task force lacked active and consistent involvement by a sufficient 
number of senior real estate lenders from Pennsylvania banks. Certainly there were some, and 
just as certainly, there were a few lenders who reliably participated. In general, however, the 
banking industry was represented on the FRE task force mostly by bank community affairs staff, 
who lacked sufficient decision-making influence within their institutions for what was ultimately 
seen as a real estate investment decision. Too often, even these few bankers were a minority at 
meetings dominated, numerically at least, by service professionals who were not likely to be 
ultimate investors in the entity itself. 
  The underlying theory that members of a strong and committed task force would be the 
best advocates for investments from their own sponsors was undermined for other reasons. For 
the entire period during which Phoenix and TDF attempted to create and capitalize FRE, and 
especially in the critical span of some 15 months in 2002 and 2003 when the interim report was 
approved, the financial projections and the PPM were prepared, and fundraising efforts were 
conducted, the Pennsylvania banking industry went through a period of significant consolidation   
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and transformation. Effects of these rolling changes were quite visible at the task force. Banks 
that had been strong participants disappeared into other institutions. A major statewide bank that 
was expected to become a large investor in FRE left the real estate market entirely. A leader of 
the FRE process went through two changes in employers in very short order. Other players 
changed roles or employers. 
  In addition, many task force participants and potential bank investors were reporting a 
pronounced sense of “consortia burnout,” reflecting a perception that too many special-purpose 
consortia were already competing for contributions. At least one large bank stated that its current 
investment policy was to decline invitations from all new consortia, regardless of how well 
intentioned or designed. As a consequence, any benefit gained by including individual bank 
representatives in the creative process was substantially devalued by this far more significant 
disinclination at the institutional level to support yet another funding consortium. This 
represented yet another external obstacle that FRE was unable to overcome. 
  As a result of these many shifts, FRE found itself with few of the expected benefits from 
the lengthy task force process. Some individuals and institutions who were expected to be 
sympathetic to the eventual fundraising request based on their prior exposure to the process were 
no longer in positions to advocate for FRE at all. Even where task force members or leaders were 
still in relevant positions, it was often with new superiors or at new institutions where they were 
understandably far more cautious about pushing forward a new and risky investment vehicle.  
Thus, TDF and Phoenix found that they often needed to draw FRE on a blank slate for potential 
investors who were totally unfamiliar with the project. 
  The process itself could not, of course, escape being adversely influenced by the   
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difficulties that TDF, Phoenix, and the task force encountered in trying to clearly define FRE’s 
unique market niche and products. The image of a cohesive and energized task force is grounded 
on the expectation that it will settle upon a shared vision that unites its members for action.  
Unfortunately, the FRE task force never coalesced around a common vision. Thus, task force 
meetings intended (at least in part) to serve as pep rallies to build camaraderie and support before 
the final fundraising push instead revealed lack of interest or became incubators for disagreement 
and frustration. 
  TDF and Phoenix certainly bear their share of responsibility for process shortcomings.  
The nonprofit sponsors were ultimately unable to effectively respond to complaints that the task 
force meetings seemed redundant and inconclusive and relied too heavily on presentations from 
TDF and Phoenix rather than the bankers themselves. Despite a variety of efforts, they were 
unable to organize the task force meetings in ways that promoted extended discussions by task 
force members themselves or actually produced clear resolution of issues. TDF and Phoenix 
were slow to recognize the change in the dynamics of the banking business that greatly devalued 
the use of inclusive, deliberative processes to develop investment vehicles.  As a result, TDF and 
Phoenix resisted suggestions that they short-circuit the lengthy timeline and simply provide the 
task force with a finished vision of FRE’s business model for review and ratification by the 
group.   
Finally, TDF and Phoenix were probably guilty of thinking like Pollyanna: They 
underestimated the true significance of the failure of the process to reach a substantive common 
vision for FRE, convincing themselves instead that these difficulties could be addressed during 
or after fundraising. That belief turned out to be wrong. Even if it were reasonable to think that   
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the substantive divide could have been bridged at a later point, that approach failed to appreciate 
that the absence of a shared purpose might suppress task force members’ ability to 
wholeheartedly support the capital campaign. 
Unattractive Investment Vehicle 
  Financial institutions and corporations were unwilling to support FRE with capital 
contributions. Put plainly, this meant that the investment product FRE offered to them – in 
contrast to the lending products FRE proposed to offer its own borrowers – was not attractive. 
  Although few potential investors provided formal, definitive reasons for their negative 
decisions, comments and questions from investor representatives suggested several consistent 
reservations.  First, it is clear that TDF, Phoenix, and the task force overestimated the importance 
to bank investors of CRA credit for participation in FRE. Although comments at task force 
meetings routinely suggested that banks were always looking for CRA-eligible activities and that 
FRE’s ability to offer that benefit would be a strong selling point, that prediction turned out to be 
quite wrong in practice. Investor spokespersons repeatedly stated that their institutions were 
doing more than sufficient CRA-qualifying activities and that the potential for FRE to augment 
that portfolio was of very little benefit to them. 
  Additionally, some banks sought more definitive assurance that their investments in FRE 
would qualify under CRA. Unfortunately, it was impossible to secure formal CRA approval of 
investments in FRE prior to its capitalization and commencement of activities.
13 Ultimately, it is 
 
13 One bank member of the task force formally requested that the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia confirm in writing that FRE would qualify as a CRA investment. Consistent with Federal 
Reserve policy, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia does not respond in writing to individual letters 
seeking advance determinations of CRA eligibility. A specific investment is evaluated as CRA eligible 
only at the time of a CRA examination by on-site examiners. Each of the four regulatory entities – the 
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the   
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difficult to know whether this uncertainty about the availability of CRA credit was of greater 
significance in some banks’ decisions to participate than the lack of excitement about CRA credit 
itself. Banks were aware of the strong and reasonable possibility that FRE would qualify. TDF 
and Phoenix were never able to get bankers to discuss contingent commitments that would have 
required FRE to demonstrate its CRA eligibility before significant investment would become 
obligated. For these reasons, TDF and Phoenix concluded that banks’ reduced motivation to 
obtain CRA credit, not doubt about its availability, was the predominant motivating factor 
against investment. 
  Stripped of the expected noneconomic bonus of valuable CRA benefits, the FRE 
investment needed to stand exclusively on the rates of return – identified in the financial 
projections as 4.1 percent for debt investors and 8.7 percent for equity investors – it projected for 
its investors.  Unfortunately, TDF and Phoenix had repeatedly predicted in meetings that these 
rates would only be “reasonable” (i.e., not competitive with conventional market returns) and 
were not designed to be attractive without the additional CRA or public-purpose component.  
This characterization, offered facilely at the time that CRA credits were assumed to be a 
significant positive factor for investor decisions, turned chillingly prophetic when that 
assumption turned out to be unfounded.
14  Investors simply rejected the anticipated returns as 
unappealing in light of the general economic climate in 2002 and the risky nature of FRE’s 
 
Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision – addresses questions of this sort prospectively only 
through periodic agency question-and-answer documents that avoid specific determinations. 
 
14 It is frequently difficult to draw sharp delineations between process problems and investment 
problems.  In retrospect, it is easy to see that the process was flawed by its inability to draw the correct 
conclusion about the value of CRA credit to potential investors.  Although development of FRE’s 
financial projections occurred reasonably late in the process, it is plausible to suspect that task force 
participants might have examined the value of the CRA component of FRE more closely if the rates of   
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proposed business activities. 
  Although undoubtedly a lesser consideration, it became clear that at least some banks 
were also troubled by the exit strategy that the FRE investment agreement would allow them.  To 
provide stability and predictability for operations, FRE would have required investors to honor 
their pledges for a minimum of five years before being able to withdraw from further 
participation. Coupled with the modest rate of return and the projected timetable for receiving 
these returns, the length of this commitment made investment in FRE quite unattractive for a 
number of investors. As before, this exit strategy had been subjected to express discussion and 
presumed ratification by the task force prior to finalization.  Nonetheless, the task force members 
were unable or unwilling to convince their respective decision-makers that this was a reasonable 
limitation for FRE to impose. 
Downturn in the National Economy and Other Considerations 
  A number of other factors played parts in investors’ uniformly negative decisions.  FRE’s 
initial kick-off meeting occurred in December 1999; formal fundraising efforts began in mid 
2002 and were finally suspended in the summer of 2003.  Indisputably, the national and regional 
economies worsened significantly during the lengthy arc of FRE’s development. Banks saw their 
business levels decline, stock values droop, and profits diminish.  They became predictably less 
enchanted with new and unproven ventures. There was a substantial downturn in the volume of 
real estate lending by banks, and a commensurate waning of their appetite for investments based 
upon real estate activities.  FRE presented itself for financial support in the midst of this storm.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that critical comments were expressed on occasion 
about the value or effectiveness of TDF, a “West  Coast” organization, in developing a response 
 
projected economic return had been presented to them at an earlier point.   
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to a Pennsylvania problem. Professionals participating in the FRE process became frustrated by 
TDF’s perceived inexperience with Pennsylvania remediation practices and rules. Moreover, 
TDF’s nearly contemporaneous work to create and fund CERF in California paradoxically turned 
out to be detrimental to the Pennsylvania process.  TDF and Phoenix expected that insights from 
the California experiences, which were approximately six months ahead of the work of the FRE 
task force, would enlighten the discussion of similar issues and allow the task force to realize 
valuable economies in time and effort. Unfortunately, comments intended by TDF and Phoenix 
to introduce California developments simply as the starting point for task force discussions were 
frequently perceived as attempts to direct FRE to reflexively mimic the California project.   
These reservations most likely interacted with another salient characteristic of the FRE 
process: The project was originated by the nonprofits that led the effort, not by any of the 
private-sector players that would ultimately be needed to provide the capital and the brownfield 
projects that FRE would support. As a result, the project had no visible local leadership from 
business or banking interests that were identified with the underlying notion or strongly 
committed to its success.  The absence of such leadership only magnified concerns that FRE was 
being directed by outsiders who really sought only to replicate a design imported from 
elsewhere, not develop an indigenous and relevant Pennsylvania model.                   
TDF and Phoenix were not successful in demonstrating that these concerns selectively 
overlooked TDF’s long, national, varied, and relevant experience. In the end, TDF and Phoenix 
were not successful in convincing the task force that it should seize the real decision-making 
authority that was offered to it or in inspiring it to energetically commit to the effort. Thus, these 
reservations also contributed to the inability to develop the level of enthusiasm and commitment   
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necessary to sustain the participants throughout the long process. 
 
Conclusion 
  FRE was promoted by established nonprofit organizations and attracted significant high-
level sponsorship and procedural support.  Nonetheless, its promoters were ultimately unable to 
develop cohesion among necessary investing participants and failed to recognize that critical 
decisions either remained unmade or had been accepted at best with limited enthusiasm.  These 
oversights from the developmental phase of the project, combined with significant negative 
factors in the business environment at the time FRE sought capital, finally rendered the FRE 
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Pennsylvania Postscript 
  Governor Edward G. Rendell has made the revitalization of existing urban areas a high 
priority for his administration.  To promote this rebirth, he has introduced or revised a number of 
programs designed to provide public funding for projects that will advance this objective. Since 
many brownfield sites are located in previously developed urban areas or their immediate 
surroundings, it is natural that many of these programs should include specific provisions to 
encourage brownfield reuse.  According to information available on a Commonwealth website, 
“The Governor’s proposed budget will provide $40 million over four years to clean up 
brownfields and rebuild towns and cities across the [sic] Pennsylvania.” 
  The administration has formed a Brownfield Action Team (BAT) to enhance interaction 
between DEP’s land recycling program staff and local community proponents of projects on 
distressed sites. The team appears to be designed to coordinate the preparation of application 
materials and pre-screen potential applicants, promising that projects accepted into the BAT 
program will gain increased access to financial assistance available from the Commonwealth. 
  The Industrial Sites Reuse program is still a potential source of funds and is specifically 
referenced in the Brownfield Action Team program materials. In addition, the administration has 
created a $300 million loan and grant pool, capitalized by the issuance of state bonds, called 
Business In Our Sites.  This program makes funding available to communities statewide to help 
them develop “shovel-ready sites to accommodate expanding businesses, thus building the local 
and regional economy and ultimately creating jobs.” Business In Our Sites will provide funding 
in the form of either grants or low-interest loans for environmental site assessment and 
remediation of qualifying projects. Grant and loan sizes are substantially larger than those   
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previously available through the ISR program. Assessment funding, however, appears to be 
available only to public and quasi-public entities. Remediation funding is available to the same 
applicants. Construction financing, which does not appear to encompass remediation funding, is 
available to private developers. 
This program has a short history and is still developing its funding practices. It certainly 
puts a far greater amount of money into play for use at brownfield sites. As under previous 
programs, however, its scope appears limited to public participants. A similar guideline in the 
ISR program attempted to limit its reach to public projects. Private developers learned that they 
could sometimes gain entree to ISR funds for a desired project simply by persuading the 
responsible public entity to serve as the formal applicant for support. It is too early to know 
whether a similar practice will be allowed to develop within the parameters of the Business In 
Our Sites program. 
  It is difficult to gauge at this point how significantly these enhanced public programs will 
affect the marketplace for brownfield borrowing in Pennsylvania. There is no doubt that the 
magnitude of dollars that these programs make available is far greater than was previously 
offered. It is a significant amount for a public funding program, but it still represents only a small 
fraction of the total real estate activity in the Commonwealth each year that seeks debt financing.  
Additionally, the focus remains on public projects. It may be difficult for private developers to 
gain access to the funding, even with a supportive public partner. Thus, time and experience with 
the administration’s new efforts is needed before a judgment can be made whether a brownfield 
financing gap remains an impediment to redevelopment in Pennsylvania. 